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In their stimulating discussion of monkey communication and
socialisation, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) mention autism as an
example of the dissociation possible between social and non-
social intelligence (p. 270). We would like to suggest that autism
is also an important example for many of the other points raised
in this excellent book. Although the authors suggest a parallel
between vervet and normal human infant communication (p.
173), an even more informative analogy can be made with the
abilities and handicaps of people with autism. These individuals
suffer from a circumscribed brain abnormality (from a variety of
biological causes) that affects development from birth. The basis
of their handicap is a specific cognitive disorder that results in
the absence of theory of mind. This in turn leads to specific
impairments in imagination, socialisation, and communication
(Frith 1989). We raise only a few points here that arise from our
explanation of the three core features of autism and relate to
issues in primate research.
Pretence. One area where monkeys are more like autistic
children than like normal infants, or Down syndrome children,
is pretence. C & S conclude that there is little good evidence of
pretence in monkeys. Autistic people - unlike normal two-year-
olds - also fail to show pretend play (Wulff 1985). It was this
observation that was crucial in suggesting that autistic people
might also lack a theory of mind, because both require the
ability to represent mental states (Leslie 1987).
Socialisation. The hypothesis that autistic people - like C &
S's vervets - lack a theory of mind, can account well for the core
handicaps of autism. Like monkeys, however, autistic people
are capable of social skills that do not involve a theory of mind.
So, for example, autistic children can use sabotage (manipula-
tion of behavior) to achieve a desired end, although they cannot
use deception (manipulation of beliefs, Russell et al. 1991;
Sodian & Frith, in press). Primates, too, probably manipulate
behaviour rather than mental states. Sabotage is seen, for
example, in the bonobos who removed the means of escape from
the moat to leave individuals below stranded (p. 211). Such
behaviour seems to indicate an understanding of goal-directed-
ness, and a parallel, rudimentary understanding of desires as
drives seems to be present in autism (Baron-Cohen 1991a; Tan
& Harris 1990). Autistic people can also understand and manip-
ulate seeing (Hobson 1984; Leslie & Frith 1988) in much the
same way a monkey or ape may be able to conceal information,
for example, by hiding from dominant males behind a rock
before grooming a subordinate male (p. 191).
Communication. C & S make a distinction between "calls that
provide information only about the signaller's emotional state or
subsequent behaviour . . . and calls that denote a specific ex-
ternal referent" (p. 104). This is clearly a useful distinction when
the signaller's intention to signal is in question, but it may be
that the distinction becomes less useful when dealing with
deliberate communication - such as the vervets' vocalisations.
Here a distinction between internal (as cognitively simple) and
external (as more complex) referents could be -misleading. Con-
fusion could arise because the two categories above overlap with
two very different categories that have been found to be useful
in looking at the quality of autistic communication.
Expressive versus instrumental communication. In autistic
people it has been fruitful to examine whether the gestures and
speech produced are protodeclarative or protoimperative. Pro-
todeclarative gestures indicate an external referent to communi-
cate something about the signaller's internal state ("Look at that
bird; I'm interested in it!"). Protoimperatives, on the other
hand, indicate an external referent to achieve a behavioural end
("Look at that bird; give it to me!"). The cognitive and social
sophistication underlying these two categories, however, is
precisely the reverse of that ascribed to C & S's classes -
protodeclaratives are more advanced because they require a
theory of mind. Not surprisingly, then, protoimperative point-
ing is understood and used by autistic children, but pro-
todeclarative pointing is not (Baron-Cohen 1989b). Similarly,
autistic children use instrumental gestures but not expressive
gestures (Attwood et al. 1988).
Ostensive versus coded communication. The protodeclarative/
protoimperative distinction is also related to the distinction
between ostensive-inferential communication and coded com-
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munication (Sperber & Wilson 1986; see also multiple book
review of "Relevance" BBS 10(4) 1987). Ostention is behaviour
that alerts others to and makes clear the actor's intention to
convey some piece of information. We would predict that
neither the autistic person nor the monkey would be capable of
ostensive-inferential communication - because neither has a
theory of mind capable of systematically representing and ma-
nipulating intentions. On the other hand, communication in
autistics and monkeys can still be achieved by means of coded
communication. Unfortunately, coded communication is rela-
tively inflexible, because signals have a set meaning that is not
dependent on contextual factors or the signaller's intention. In
autism, the single-word instrumental speech and echolalia com-
monly seen (Paul 1987) may be a form of coded communication
(i.e., "apple" always means, "Give me apple!").
No!" In monkeys the availability of coded communication and
the lack of ostensive-inferential communication may explain the
absence of an equivalent for the word "No!" in vervet vocalisa-
tions (p. 226). Humans use the word "no" in a flexible way; its
precise meaning varies with context, because we understand
this "vocalisation" in terms of a speaker's intention rather than
as a code. Such flexible "loose usage" would seem to be impossi-
ble without an understanding of mental states (Happe 1991). It
is not yet known how flexibly autistic people use this term, but
we would predict that they use "No!" as a code with a set
meaning (such as "Go away!").
Pedagogy. The presence of ostensive behaviour would greatly
increase the likelihood of pedagogy. Unless individuals pay
attention preferentially to ostensive versus nonostensive be-
haviour the opportunity for teaching is severely restricted.
Ostention should receive preferential attention because it car-
ries a guarantee of relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 1986).
Social and nonsocial intelligence. C & S claim that "a crucial
distinction between humans and other primates may be that
humans are better able to generalise, or extend, skills used in
social interactions to nonsocial domains" (p. 262). It seems a
plausible and exciting possibility that awareness of mental rep-
resentations preceded and provoked the use of other represen-
tations, such as notational systems, in evolution. Within the
individual and on the developmental time-scale, however,
there seems to be relatively little proof of generalisation of social
skills to nonsocial domains. In normal children, for example,
social skills are relatively independent of other abilities (Nunez
& Riviere 1990). Similarly, there are autistic people who have an
above average IQ despite their handicaps in imagination, so-
cialisation and communication (Gillberg 1991). In contrast,
some high-functioning autistic people may be able to use their
nonsocial intelligence to unravel the mysteries of social situa-
tions. These people seem able to solve social problems only by
using their general intellectual capacities, or perhaps by revers-
ing the evolutionary story and using such nonmental represen-
tations as pictures as a model for understanding mental states.
Close connections between social and nonsocial intelligence in
humans may therefore be a feature of abnormal rather than
normal development.
We would like to suggest that some light might be thrown on
the question of why social and nonsocial intelligence are so
distinct in primates by studying their understanding of such
nonmental representations as maps and photographs. The un-
derstanding of nonmental representations may tell us whether
monkeys are more like young (pre-theory-of-mind) normals or
more like autistic individuals. While autistic children seem to
understand the representational nature of photographs
(Leekam & Perner, in press; Leslie & Thaiss, in press), normal
3-year-olds do not understand "false" photographs (Zaitchik
1990) and have difficulty using a model as a map (DeLoache
1987). If primates can understand the representational nature of
maps, models, and photographs, could they perhaps be taught
to use such nonmental representations as models for under-
standing their own thoughts?
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